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ABSTRACT
In 2006, Drinkaware was established as a charity in the United Kingdom following a memorandum of understanding
between the Portman Group and various UK government agencies. This debate piece briefly reviews the international
literature on industry social aspects organizations, examines the nature of Drinkaware’s activities and considers how
the public health community should respond. Although the British addiction field and the wider public health com-
munity have distanced themselves from the Portman Group, they have not done so from Drinkaware, even though
Drinkaware was devised by the Portman Group to serve industry interests. Both long-standing and more recent
developments indicate very high levels of industry influence on British alcohol policy, and Drinkaware provides one
mechanism of influence. We suggest that working with, and for, industry bodies such as Drinkaware helps disguise
fundamental conflicts of interest and serves only to legitimize corporate efforts to promote partnership as a means of
averting evidence-based alcohol policies. We invite vigorous debate on these internationally significant issues and
propose that similar industry bodies should be carefully studied in other countries.
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Drinkaware began as a website set up in 2004 by the
Portman Group, an alcohol producer-funded organiza-
tion which has attempted to influence the evidential
content of policy debates through a range of tactics,
including attempts to pay academics to write anonym-
ous critiques of World Health Organization (WHO)-
sponsored evidence reviews [1–3]. The Portman Group
featured prominently in the previous UK government’s
2004 strategy for reducing alcohol-related harms, being
responsible for the provision of information on alcohol to
the public [4]. This was strongly criticized at the time
[5,6]. In 2006, Drinkaware was established as a separate
charity ‘with the objective of positively changing public
behaviour and the national drinking culture to help
reduce alcohol misuse and minimise alcohol-related
harm’ following a memorandum of understanding
between the Portman Group, the Department of Health,
the Home Office and the devolved administrations for
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland [7].
Globalization has concentrated alcohol production
among a small number of large multi-national compa-
nies. The alcohol market was worth US$979 billion in
2007, 40% of which is controlled by just 10 producers
[8]. Large corporations invest heavily in a range of
activities to foster national and international policy
environments which favour their interests [9]. Access to
internal tobacco industry documents resulting from US
litigation, including those concerning the jointly owned
Miller Brewing Company and Phillip Morris [10,11],
shows that companies in both industries use corporate
social responsibility (CSR) activities to hone their
reputations, which in turn helps them to access and
influence policy makers [12].
SOCIAL ASPECTS/PUBLIC RELATIONS
ORGANIZATIONS (SAPROS)
Central to the alcohol industry’s CSR activities are social
aspects/public relations organizations (SAPROs), set up
‘to manage issues that may be detrimental to its interests,
particularly in areas that overlap with public health’
[2]. SAPROs divert attention away from population-level
strategies that limit the availability, price and promotion
of alcohol, and thus threaten corporate profits, towards
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those focused on individual responsibility [13]. SAPROs
operate in policy and research by disseminating consen-
sus statements and codes of practice [14]. They have
grown very rapidly over the last decade, and Drinkaware
and the Portman Group are among more than 40
alcohol-related SAPROs now operating in at least 27
countries [1]. There has not been a systematic review of
SAPRO activity [15], so we draw upon experience with
the Australian SAPRO, Drinkwise, to compare its modus
operandum with that of Drinkaware.
Drinkwise was established in 2005 by the alcohol
industry and funded later by the federal government of
Australia in 2006. It describes itself as ‘an independent,
not-for-profit organisation focused on promoting change
towards a healthier and safer drinking culture in Aus-
tralia’. When given public funding, critics argued that it
should advocate evidence-based public health policies
[16]. Instead, Drinkwise lobbied the government for inef-
fectual information programmes (its tagline is ‘Get the
Facts’) while opposing evidence-based policies not in
industry interests [17]. In 2009, 57 health experts and
scientists wrote to the Medical Journal of Australia oppos-
ing further public funding and declaring that they would
not accept funding from Drinkwise [18]. Drinkwise
responded by writing individually to selected signatories,
including two of the present authors, suggesting that the
letter was defamatory and implying possible litigation, in
the manner of the tobacco industry [19].
WHAT DOES DRINKAWARE DO?
Drinkaware is not publicly funded, although its activities
are very similar to those of Drinkwise. It is ‘the mecha-
nism in England for government-industry partnership on
public education campaigns’ [7]. Its sophisticated multi-
media website is promoted widely on alcohol packaging
andmarketing, althoughmuch less prominently than the
core content (see Fig. 1). Drinkaware and Drinkwise
have similar forms of governance, annual budgets and
stated aims. Both have doctors and corporate members
on their boards, and claim to provide independent,
evidence-based advice to the public, particularly to
help individuals make informed decisions about their
drinking.
Minimum unit pricing (MUP) is a key proposal in
recent British alcohol policy that was opposed strongly
by sectors of the industry [20]. Aside from the commit-
ment to MUP, the UK Government strategy placed part-
nership with industry at the heart of policy [21]. The
result has been an energetic public debate about the
evidence supporting MUP. However, the Drinkaware
website, despite being promoted as the place the public
should go to ‘for the facts’ [22], did not acknowledge the
existence of any evidence supporting MUP. During the
debates which followed the release of the government
alcohol strategy it suggested that ‘Happy hours would
also become slightly less cheerful’ and refers wistfully to
‘the days of the £10 crate of beer’ among other nega-
tively toned, out-dated content—see Box 1. The website-
linked tweets in Box 2 sent by Drinkaware include
content that normalizes alcohol use and provides cues to
drink on occasions when it may not be planned. For
example, there is no British tradition of Halloween
parties involving alcohol.
Drinkaware claims that its founding memorandum of
understanding [7] precludes its involvement in policy
issues; yet when MUP was debated in Scotland [23],
Drinkaware’s written evidence to the 2009–10 Health
Select Committee (HSC) alcohol enquiry argued that:
‘Behavioural change is a process which cannot happen
quickly. The UK drinking culture can be changed if edu-
cational initiatives receive sufficient investment over a
long enough period’ [24]. In the 2012 HSC alcohol
enquiry, these claims of non-involvement in policy were
repeated (e.g. ‘we are proscribed from talking about policy
or lobbying’) in the face of several examples to the con-
trary, and incredulity among HSC members (see ques-
tions 86–109 in Ev16-18 in [25]).
CONCERNS ABOUT DRINKAWARE
The 2012 HSC [25] noted significant concerns about
industry influence on Drinkaware and the content, pur-
poses and value of its activities—see Box 3. A long-
delayed review of Drinkaware’s effectiveness, which the
HSC hoped would address the ‘perceived lack of inde-
pendence’ from industry influence, was published early in
2013. The review, undertaken by an ‘integrated creative
communications agency’ [26], was overseen by a five-
member panel including Jeremy Beadles, Corporate Rela-
tions Director of Heineken UK and former Chief Executive
Figure 1 Health promotion or alcohol advertising?
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of the Wine and Spirit Trade Association (WSTA), who
oversaw a vigorous WSTA effort to dissuade the Scottish
Government from introducing MUP [27,28]. The
Drinkaware website also describes as ‘independent
research’ an evaluation of the website by a ‘brand and
communications research company’ who see their role as
helping ‘our clients build stronger brands through the use
of better and more relevant communications’ [29]. Both
advertising agencies have histories of working with the
alcohol industry.
The review identifies ‘a perception of industry influ-
ence resulting in a suspicion that Drinkaware is not truly
Box 1 Drinkaware website content*
What’s in a unit? Alcohol minimum pricing
Introduction
The Chief Medical Officer recently recommended alcohol to have aminimumprice per unit. Howwould this affect
you?
Eight out of 10 people don’t know the correct amount of units recommended in Government guidelines
Sir Liam Donaldson proposed that the minimum price for a unit of alcohol should be 50p per unit to curb binge
drinking. For example, a 13% bottle of wine containing nine units of alcohol could not be sold for less than £4.50.
Cheap supermarket promotions on bulk quantities of alcohol would also get pricier—long gone would be the days
of the £10 crate of beer.
Happy hours would also become slightly less cheerful. Minimum pricing could bring an end to some drinks
promotions in pubs and bars. For instance, a pint of lager with an alcohol content of 5% contains nearly 3 alcohol
units, so with a minimum pricing of 50p per unit it couldn’t be sold for less than £1.50.
What exactly is a unit?
So with all this talk about alcohol units, what exactly are they? Unfortunately it’s not as simple as one drink
equalling one unit. A unit is 10 mL or 8 g of pure alcohol. To put this into context, you would consume one unit of
alcohol if you drank a 25 mL single measure of whisky (ABV 40%), or a third a pint of beer (ABV 5–6%) or half a
standard (175 mL) glass of red wine (ABV 12%).
Many people don’t have a realistic idea of howmuch they’re drinking. In fact, Drinkaware’s research shows that
eight out of 10 people don’t know the correct amount of units that are recommended in Government guidelines. It’s
recommended thatmen should not regularly drinkmore than 3–4 units a day and thatwomen should not regularly
exceed 2–3 units a day.
You can use our interactive Drinks Calculator tool to work out whether you might be drinking above the
Government guidelines and also get tips on cutting down your daily intake if the results take you by surprise.
So is minimum pricing far away?
Whether or not the Chief Medical Officer’s recommendations to put a minimum pricing of 50p on every unit of
alcohol become reality remains to be seen. Gordon Brown’s immediate reaction to the proposal was that putting a
minimum price on alcohol would bring additional burdens on moderate drinkers.
The minimum pricing headlines ensure that the debate around the UK’s alcohol culture continues to be in the
spotlight. At Drinkaware, our sole aim is to provide people with the information to decide for themselves about what
role alcohol plays in their lives. Whether it be helping consumers understand units or allowing them to keep track
of their alcohol consumption, we will continue to provide all the facts.
*This page was created on 16/03/09, was last updated on 10/05/12 and was accessed on 21/11/12. It has since been
removed as part of a major redesign of the website.
Box 2 Tweets from Drinkaware
drinkaware @drinkaware 12 October 2012 8.11 a.m.
It’s the most popular day for work drinks! 71% of 18–24s report heading out with colleagues on a Friday. Helpful tips:
http://ow.ly/eqCpe
drinkaware @drinkaware 31 October 2012 7.43 a.m.
Want to make it to the witching hour and avoid feeling like a zombie tomorrow? Read our Halloween party tips. . .
http://ow.ly/eUEV2
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independent of the alcohol industry’ ([2.8] in [30]) and
criticizes a lack of clarity about the mission and purpose
of Drinkaware. It finds no evidence of ‘undue industry
influence’ ([2.32] in [30]). Although recommending the
building of an evidence base, it is not clear how industry
actors can contribute to this when they promote informa-
tion alone as sufficient for bringing about behaviour
change ([9.14] in [30]). Both industry actors and the
authors of the review treat funding as ‘investment’ and
see the Drinkaware brand as having explicit value for the
companies associated with it. For example, complaining
of industry bodies that do not provide funding for
Drinkaware, one funder suggested: ‘too many organisa-
tions that get to use the Drinkaware brand, get to benefit
from what Drinkaware offers without actually having to
put any cash up’ ([12.8] in [30]).
WHY DOES DRINKAWARE MATTER?
Alcohol problems in the United Kingdom continue to
increase while they decline in most of Europe [31].
Drinkaware has hitherto avoided concerted public health
attention as an alcohol industry body. Its centrality to
policy has seemed unremarkable because it merely con-
tinues in the public information role fulfilled previously
by the Portman Group [4]. Despite the growing problems
alcohol causes British health and society, lobbying has
successfully positioned the alcohol industry very close to
successive UK governments [32]. Henry Ashworth, the
Chief Executive of the Portman Group, moved into that
role directly from the UK Government Cabinet Office
Behavioural Insights Team. Interestingly, a different situ-
ation pertains in Scotland, where the implementation of
MUP is most advanced. There, the current government is
not formed by aWestminster-led party and does not have
close relationships with the alcohol industry [23].
It has been observed that the chapter on working with
industry in the March 2012 UK Government’s Alcohol
Strategy ‘eschews any enhanced regulatory stance; con-
crete recommendations are absent . . . corporate friendly
content on the importance of alcohol to the economy,
and the need to cut red tape, i.e. deregulation’ [21] are
emphasized instead. The intent of this material became
apparent in late 2012when the government launched its
Consultation on the Implementation of the Strategy [33].
Impact assessments described various options for extend-
ing the availability of alcohol to places such as florists and
motorway service areas. Early in 2013 it was reported
that MUP would not be implemented and industry lobby-
ing was the reason, according to a Conservative Member
of Parliament with a health background [34].
WHAT TO DO ABOUT DRINKAWARE?
Because of high levels of support from successive UK gov-
ernments, Drinkaware has attracted medical and aca-
demic colleagues to support and work with it, and its
materials are used in the National Health Service (NHS).
In addition to examining Drinkaware’s specific activities,
the wider economic context needs to be considered. Both
Drinkaware and the Portman Group belong to a global
network of SAPROs. Corporations are legally required to
protect shareholder interests, and any expenditure—
including that on SAPROs or any other CSR activity—
will necessarily be servant to this obligation. The alcohol
industry has to find a way to reconcile pursuit of profits
through increased sales and thus consumption, with the
needs of governments to act to reduce the attendant
increases in health and societal costs. One possible stra-
tegic direction is an aspiration to exercise ‘soft power’ in
the form of ‘subtle forms of steering and control, con-
straining and limiting the options available for political
choice’ [35]. This requires a ‘post-political’ style of part-
nership in which SAPROs work with governments in
order to draw attention away from fundamental conflicts
between economic with social and health interests [35].
SAPROs are especially useful as they can claim not to
have any economic interests themselves.
Box 3 2012 Parliamentary Health Select
Committee views on Drinkaware [25]
‘Chris Sorek stressed that Drinkaware is an independ-
ent charity[80], but its role is seen by some as com-
promised because of its links with the alcohol
industry. The British Medical Association told us that
The involvement of the DrinkawareTrust in provid-
ing public health communications is a significant
area of concern. This form of industry social market-
ing is counterproductive because industry responsi-
bility campaigns are less effective than ones from
other sources, keepmessages in a commercial comfort
zone, and distract attention away from more effective
measures to regulate alcohol use. Industry-related
messages about alcohol have been found to subtly
enhance sales and company reputations. This is
despite the fact that the public is cynical about the
motives of corporate sponsors, and that non-
governmental organisations make a more effective
and credible source.’ (Paragraph 94) (page 32)
The HSC recommended that:
if Drinkaware is to make a significant contribution to
education and awareness over the coming years its per-
ceived lack of independence needs to be tackled, and as part
of the review that is to be held this year the Committee
recommends that further steps are taken to entrench that
independence. (Paragraph 97) (page 33)
522 Jim McCambridge et al.
©2013 The Authors. Addiction published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of The Society for the Study of Addiction Addiction, 109, 519–524
We encourage NHS commissioners, public health
practitioners and academic colleagues to reconsider their
relationships with Drinkaware. Most would not engage
with the Portman Group and we suggest that there is
no obvious basis for viewing its offspring, Drinkaware,
any differently. Importantly, the review of Drinkaware
laments its ‘isolation within the alcohol harm reduction
community’ ([2.8] in [30]), and Drinkaware is actively
seeking to recruit scientists to support it (including the
first author). The British public health community should
bear inmindWHO’s recommendation that alcohol indus-
try bodies only be engaged in their roles as producers,
distributors and retailers [36]. Key corporate tactics in
influencing policy include the manufacture of doubt
about unfavourable evidence [37] and creating divisions
among researchers [21,38].
The evolving international literature provides new
frameworks for understanding SAPRO and other CSR
activities [1]. These are needed to address the historically
unparalleled levels of concern about the international
activities of the global alcohol industry [39,40]. SAPROs
work with, and learn from, each other. The Portman
Group/Drinkaware operational model, whereby a public
information role is assumed by the latter SAPRO, and the
former more obviously promotes industry positions on
alcohol-related issues, may well be replicated in other
countries.
National governments and their policy-making pro-
cesses are key targets for the alcohol industry [41]. The
addiction and public health research communities
should examine industry influence on alcohol policies
[42]. Drinkaware, like other SAPROs, appears to us to be
an industry vehicle to subvert evidence-based public
health policy.We propose that it is notworthy of any form
of support. In the past the Portman Group divested itself
of a public information function, so SAPROs may also be
dispensable to the alcohol industry if they do not further
its strategic objectives. We urge policy-makers to address
industry influence on global and national alcohol policies
[39,43,44] more assertively to reverse the mounting toll
of alcohol on population health and social wellbeing.
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